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SCIENTIFIC: ALLOCATING THE
BURDEN OF PROOF IN
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
ACTIONS FOR PATENT NONINFRINGMENT
BRIANNA STRANGE
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Patent & Trademark Office granted 276,788 patents in
1
2012, creating 276,788 new opportunities to license patent rights and
276,788 new chances for patent infringement. Aware of the
2
notoriously high costs of patent litigation and the significance of
3
patents to company profitability, the Supreme Court granted
4
certiorari in Medtronic, Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corporation.
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especially Ravi Patel and Tara McGrath, for all of their help and feedback.
1. PATENT TECHNOLOGY MONITORY TEAM, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS, CALENDAR
YEARS 1963-2012, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, (2013), http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf.
2. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical
Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 2 (2005) (“Patent litigation has been
called the sport of kings; it is complex, uncertain, and expensive.”); Shawn P. Miller, What’s the
Connection Between Repeat Litigation and Patent Quality? A (Partial) Defense of the Most
Litigated Patents, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 313, 313 (2013) (“Patent litigation is notoriously
expensive.”).
3. See Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical
Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 115 (2010) (“[W]e find—consistent with
anecdotal reports—that many startups rely heavily on patents as signals to the market to
improve their chances of raising financing, being acquired, and going public.”). Additionally,
some commentators believe Twitter’s “dearth” of patents will deter investors. Leslie Picker,
Twitter’s Lack of Patents Seen as a Risk to Investors, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 18, 2013),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-10-18/twitter-pre-ipo-patent-paucity-seen-posinginvestor-risk-tech.
4. Medtronic, Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 133 S. Ct. 2393 (argued Nov. 5, 2013).
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Patent holders grant licensees permission to use patents in
exchange for payment of royalties on any products manufactured by
5
the licensee that utilize the licensed patent. However, patent holders
and licensees sometimes disagree about which products utilize the
6
patent. The patent holder will request royalties on a product, and the
licensee will contend the product does not utilize the patent and
therefore that no royalties are owed for that product. The Supreme
7
Court held in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. that a licensee can
seek a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity or non-infringement
to clarify whether it owes royalties on specific products without first
8
breaking its license agreement. The Court has not addressed which
party bears the burden of proof on infringement in such an action.
In Medtronic, the Court will address whether a licensee has the
burden of proving non-infringement in a declaratory judgment action
9
brought by the licensee. The patent holder has the burden of proving
infringement “in all other patent litigation, including other
10
declaratory judgment actions.” The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit allocated the burden of proving non-infringement to the
11
declaratory judgment plaintiff-licensee, Medtronic. If the plaintifflicensee did not have the burden, the court determined, licensees like
12
Medtronic could “use MedImmune’s shield as a sword.”
The Supreme Court will likely reverse the Federal Circuit ruling.
Declaratory judgments are procedural only, and in declaratory
judgment actions the substantive burden of proof should not shift
from the patent holder to the patent licensee. By shifting the burden
to the patent holder, the Federal Circuit impermissibly established a
presumption of infringement that is contrary to congressional intent.
Further, considerations of policy and fairness weigh in favor of
keeping the burden of proving infringement with the patent holder.

5. See 5 JOHN G. MILLS ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 19:16 (2d ed. 2013),
available at Westlaw PATLAWAPP.
6. Id.
7. 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
8. Id. at 137.
9. Brief for Petitioner at i, Medtronic, Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., No. 12-1128 (U.S. July
26, 2013).
10. Id.
11. Medtronic, Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 695 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted,
133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013).
12. Id.
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mirowski Family Ventures (MFV) owns the patents for the
13
biventricular pacer, a device that corrects the heartbeats of patients
14
with congestive heart failure. MFV licensed these patents exclusively
to Guidant Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Boston
15
Scientific Corporation. Guidant’s predecessor-in-interest, Eli Lilly &
16
Co., entered a sublicense agreement with Medtronic. Under the
terms of the sublicense agreement, Medtronic was free to use the
patent in its products as long as Medtronic paid MFV royalties on the
17
sales of those products. Although Medtronic paid royalties on some
of its products, MFV believed that additional products used the
patent and that Medtronic should have paid royalties on those
18
products as well.
19
In 2006, MFV, the patent holder, and Medtronic, the licensee,
20
entered into a Litigation Tolling Agreement. The agreement
required MFV to identify which of Medtronic’s products MFV
21
believed used licensed patents. Medtronic could then either pay
royalties on those products or seek a declaratory judgment that the
22
patent had not been infringed or was invalid. Medtronic chose to file
23
for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement and invalidity.
Because the license agreement remained in effect when Medtronic
brought its declaratory judgment action, MFV was barred from
24
counterclaiming for infringement.
13. Medtronic, Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 777 F. Supp. 2d 750, 758 (D. Del. 2011), rev’d,
695 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013). The pacer, now
referred to as cardiac resynchronization therapy (CRT), forces a patient’s left and right heart
ventricles to contract simultaneously, thereby increasing the efficacy of each heartbeat. Id. at
761. CRT is covered under U.S. Reissue Patents No. RE 38,119 (RE’119 patent) and No. RE
39,897 (RE’897 patent). Id. The RE’897 patent is a continuation of the RE’119 patent. Id.
14. Id. at 758.
15. Id. Hereinafter, MFV will refer to both MFV and Guidant unless otherwise noted.
16. Id. The sublicense agreement permitted Medtronic to challenge allegations of
infringement through declaratory judgment actions. Id. In 2003, Medtronic began paying
royalties into an escrow account for certain of its products that allegedly infringed the
sublicensed patents while simultaneously challenging the validity of the patents. Id. at 758–59.
17. Id. at 759.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. The Litigation Tolling Agreement suspended litigious action between the parties
until the resolution of litigation between Guidant and St. Jude over the RE’119 patent at issue
in this case or October 1, 2007, whichever came later. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp. 695 F.3d 1266, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert.
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Throughout the district court proceedings, both parties disputed
25
26
who carried the burden of proof on infringement. Relying on
27
Under Sea Industries, Inc. v. Dacor Corp., the district court held that
28
MFV, as the patent holder, had the burden of proving infringement.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed whether MFV had the
burden of proving infringement or Medtronic had the burden of
proving non-infringement in a declaratory judgment action where the
29
continued existence of the license
prevented MFV from
30
counterclaiming for infringement.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Patent Licensees Do Not Need to Break Their License Agreement
Before Seeking Declaratory Judgment
The license agreement was still in effect when Medtronic brought
the declaratory judgment action, and the continued existence of the
31
license prevented MFV from counterclaiming for infringement. This
situation differs from declaratory judgment actions where the accused
infringer does not have a license. Where there is no license, the patent
holder is required to counterclaim for infringement or else the claim
32
is lost.
The Supreme Court in MedImmune held that licensees can seek
declaratory judgment of non-infringement or invalidity without
33
having to first breach their license. There, Genentech and
MedImmune entered into a license agreement requiring MedImmune
to pay royalties on the sales of its products that incorporated
34
Genentech’s patents. Genentech notified MedImmune that one of

granted, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013).
25. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 12 (“The ‘burden of proof’ at issue in this case is
the ‘burden of persuasion,’ which lies with ‘the party who must persuade the [trier of fact] in its
favor to prevail.’” (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2254 n.1 (2011))).
26. Medtronic, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 2d at 765.
27. 833 F.2d 1551, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“The burden is always on the patentee to show
infringement.” (citing Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 758 (Fed. Cir. 1984))).
28. Medtronic, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 2d at 765. The court further held that the defendants did
not “prove literal infringement by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 769.
29. See Medtronic, Inc., 695 F.3d at 1272 (“[T]he declaratory judgment defendant is
foreclosed from counterclaiming for infringement by the continued existence of that license.”).
30. Id. at 1270.
31. See id. at 1273.
32. Id.
33. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007).
34. Id. at 121–22.
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MedImmune’s products used the licensed patent and asked
35
MedImmune to pay royalties. MedImmune paid the applicable
royalties “under protest” and filed for declaratory judgment of non36
infringement or invalidity.
The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), requires a
party seeking declaratory judgment to establish the existence of an
37
“actual controversy.” Genetech argued that MedImmune failed to
establish an actual controversy and lacked standing because the
license was not being breached while MedImmune willingly paid
38
royalties. The Court held that MedImmune did not have to break or
terminate its license agreement before seeking declaratory judgment
39
of patent invalidity or non-infringement. Preventing non-repudiating
licensees from seeking declaratory judgment would force the licensee
to essentially “bet the farm” by terminating its license agreement in
40
order to challenge the patent. By terminating the license agreement,
the licensee faces traditional infringement litigation that could
41
destroy the business built upon the patent at issue.
Justice Thomas dissented, concluding no actual controversy could
exist when any threat of an infringement suit is eliminated by the
42
continued existence of the license and royalties are voluntarily paid.
The continued existence of the license prevents the patent holder
from suing the licensee for infringement, and Thomas determined the
royalties were paid voluntarily, thereby eliminating any type of
43
coercion that would create an actual controversy. Thomas focused on
the lack of controversy where “the complaint at issue [is] ‘but a
request for an advisory opinion as to the validity of a defense to a suit
44
for recovery of the royalties.’” He would have held that the relief
sought by MedImmune amounted to an advisory opinion, as a patent
invalidity claim is raised as an affirmative defense to patent

35. Id.
36. Id. at 122 (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201(a) (West 2013) (establishing that a declaratory judgment may be
sought only “[i]n a case of actual controversy”).
38. MedImmune, Inc., 549 U.S. at 128.
39. Id. at 137.
40. Id. at 134.
41. Id. “The rule that a plaintiff must destroy a large building, bet the farm, or (as here)
risk treble damages and the loss of 80% of its business before seeking declaratory judgment of
its actively contested legal rights finds no support in Article III.” Id.
42. Id. at 146 (Thomas, J., dissenting)..
43. Id.
44. Id. at 139 (quoting Coffman v. Breeze Corps., 323 U.S. 316, 324 (1945)).
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infringement and is not a freestanding cause of action. In Thomas’s
view, declaratory judgments may be appropriate when a patent holder
threatens a competitor with an infringement suit, but not where a
license is in place, as the licensee is not forced “either to cease the
otherwise protected activity . . . or to continue in that activity and face
46
the threat of a lawsuit.”
B. Burdens of Proof in Declaratory Judgment
47

In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of declaratory judgments and reiterated
that “the operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural
48
only.” Due to the procedural nature of declaratory judgments, “the
49
substantive burden of proof normally does not shift.” With patent
infringement cases, “courts have generally recognized that any role
reversal occasioned by declaratory relief should not shift the burden
of proof from the manner in which it would be assigned in a coercive
50
infringement suit.”
There is, however, no hard and fast rule for which party has the
51
burden of proof in declaratory judgment actions. In Schaffer ex rel.
52
Schaffer v. Weast, a student was denied educational services under
the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA) and initiated a due
process hearing, as permitted by IDEA, to seek compensation for the
53
cost of subsequent schooling. The Supreme Court found the “plain
text of IDEA [wa]s silent on the allocation of the burden of
54
persuasion.” Therefore, the burden of persuasion should be
determined by the “ordinary default rule that plaintiffs bear the risk
55
of failing to prove their claims.”

45. Id. at 142 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 282(2)–(3) (2006)).
46. Id. at 146.
47. 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
48. Id. at 240.
49. Medtronic, Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 695 F.3d 1266, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing In
re Tech. Licensing Corp., 423 F.3d 1286, 1288–89 (Fed. Cir. 2005)), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2393
(May 20, 2013).
50. Id. at 1273 (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g., Inc, 200 F.3d 795, 802
(Fed. Cir. 1999)).
51. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005) (“The term ‘burden of proof’
is one of the ‘slipperiest member[s] of the family of legal terms.’” (quoting 2 J. STRONG,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 342 (5th ed. 1999))).
52. 546 U.S. 49 (2005).
53. Id. at 55.
54. Id. at 56.
55. Id.
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The Court highlighted an exception to the default rule, permitting
the burden to shift to defendants when elements of a plaintiff’s claim
56
“can be fairly characterized as affirmative defenses or exceptions.”
By asking the Court to shift the burden, the plaintiffs effectively
asked the Court “to assume that every [Individualized Education
Program] is invalid until the school district demonstrates that is not.
57
The Act d[id] not support this conclusion.”
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority’s
58
opinion in that it failed to consider policy, convenience, and fairness.
Justice Ginsburg dissented, determining that the school district was in
the best position to carry the burden due to their “better access to
information, greater expertise, and an affirmative obligation to
59
provide the contested services.” Although Schaffer settled the
burden of proof issue in the particular setting of IDEA, the opinion
left open the question of whether policy should play a role in
determining burden allocation. Moreover, the decision did not
address whether the defendant’s inability to counterclaim should be
considered.
C. Patent Infringement & Non-Infringement
Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), “whoever without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . during the term of the
patent therefor, infringes the patent.” The Federal Circuit in Under
Sea Industries, Inc. declared the burden for proving infringement
60
“always is on the patent[] [holder].” Patents are presumed valid, and
61
the party asserting invalidity has the burden of proving invalidity.
Non-infringement and invalidity are listed as a defenses “in any action
involving the validity or infringement of a patent” under 35 U.S.C. §
282(b).
Process patents are different from patents on machines or
compositions of matter. Process patents are presumptively infringed
56. Id. at 57 (citing FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1948)).
57. Id. at 59.
58. Id. at 62 (“It is common ground that no single principle or rule solves all cases by
setting forth a general test for ascertaining the incidence of proof burdens when both a statute
and its legislative history are silent on the question.”).
59. Id. at 67 (quoting Weast v. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 458 (4th Cir. 2004)
(Luttig, J., dissenting)).
60. Under Sea Industries, Inc. v. Dacor Corp., 833 F.2d 1551, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citing
Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 758 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
61. 35 U.S.C.A. § 282(a) (West 2013) (“The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or
any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”).

STRANGE 12.21.2013 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

12/21/2013 11:29 PM

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS FOR PATENT NON-INFRINGEMENT

49

when a product is offered for sale that could not plausibly be made
62
without use of the patented process. The party accused of infringing
the process patent is statutorily required to bear the burden of
establishing that the product was not made using the patented
63
process. But the patent at issue in Medtronic is not a process patent
64
and is not subject to this statutory presumption of infringement.
IV. HOLDING
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the district
65
court on the burden of proof issue. The appellate court held that “in
the limited circumstance when an infringement counterclaim by a
patent[] [holder] is foreclosed by the continued existence of a license,”
the licensee has the burden of proof when seeking a declaratory
66
judgment of non-infringement.
The court framed the burden of proof question as one arising “as
67
a consequence of the Supreme Court’s decision in MedImmune.”
The court’s analysis began with an acknowledgement of the general
rule that declaratory judgment actions do not shift the substantive
68
burden of proof. In a customary declaratory judgment case, the
defendant patent holder is required to bring an infringement
counterclaim or else the claim is lost, and this infringement
69
counterclaim effectively shifts the burden to the patent holder. But
in the post-MedImmune world, MFV, the patent holder, is precluded
from asserting an infringement counterclaim because the license is
70
still in force. It is only Medtronic asking the court to disturb the
parties’ status while, “in contrast, MFV seeks nothing more than to be
discharged from the suit and be permitted to continue the quiet
71
enjoyment of its contract.” Under the default rule, Medtronic must
72
carry the burden because it is the party requesting relief. The court
62. See id. § 295.
63. Id.
64. See U.S. Patent No. RE 39,897 (filed Aug. 8, 2002) (describing the patent as one for the
“[m]ethod and apparatus for treating hemodynamic disfunction”).
65. Medtronic, Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 695 F.3d 1266, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert.
granted, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013).
66. Id. at 1274.
67. Id. at 1271.
68. Id. at 1273.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. The court highlighted that Medtronic sought relief from paying royalties, and this type
of relief is not “the sort[] of relief generally sought when a party seeks relief for patent
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determined that requiring MFV to prove infringement when MFV is
prevented from counterclaiming for infringement “would allow
licensees to use MedImmune’s shield as a sword—haling licensors into
court and forcing them to assert and prove what had already been
73
resolved by license.”
V. ARGUMENTS
A. Arguments for Petitioner, Medtronic, Inc.
Medtronic focuses its argument primarily on the substantive law’s
allocation of the burden of proof. The Declaratory Judgment Act “is a
purely procedural statute that neither enlarges the jurisdiction of the
74
federal courts nor alters substantive rights.” Because the statute is
purely procedural, “the nominal reversal of traditional party status in
a declaratory judgment action does not alter the substantive law’s
75
allocation of the burden of proof.” Medtronic cites Aetna for
evidence that the Supreme Court “has also emphasized the
substantive equivalence of a declaratory action and the corresponding
coercive suit in holding that declaratory judgment cases can satisfy
76
Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.” The substantive
burden in declaratory actions should not shift because altering the
burden necessarily alters what should be the substantive equivalent of
77
a coercive suit. Additionally, upholding the Federal Circuit ruling
would undermine both “the [Declaratory Judgment] Act’s utility in
78
avoiding uncertainty and disruption” and “the finality of declaratory
79
judgments.”
Medtronic argues there is no precedent to support the Federal
80
Circuit’s ruling. According to Medtronic, prior to the Federal Circuit
decision, every court had correctly determined that “the burden of
proof in a declaratory judgment action involving patent infringement
is on the defendant owner of the patents at issue . . . just as if he were
infringement.” Id. at 1274.
73. Id.
74. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 15.
75. Id. at 18.
76. Id. at 22 (“It is the nature of the controversy, not the method of its presentation or the
particular party who presents it, that is determinative.” (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth,
300 U.S. 227, 244 (1937))).
77. See id.
78. Id. at 29.
79. Id. at 31.
80. See id. at 36.
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81

the plaintiff suing for infringement of those patents.” Neither MFV
nor the Federal Circuit cited “any prior decision in which a court has
charged an accused infringer with the burden of disproving patent
82
83
infringement.” On the other hand, in 35 U.S.C. § 295 Congress
expressly created a rebuttable presumption of infringement for
process patents, thus indicating that patent law does not support the
84
Federal Circuit decision.
The Federal Circuit also erred by viewing MFV as “a passive
85
participant that merely s[ought] to be discharged from the suit.”
86
MFV initiated the controversy by demanding royalty payments.
Addressing the Federal Circuit’s concern that licensees will use
MedImmune as a sword against patent holders, Medtronic argues
MedImmune cannot be used as a sword to unfairly hail patent holders
into court because a potential declaratory judgment defendant has
87
ample notice due to the nature of the action. The declaratory
judgment suit is brought, regardless of the license, because there is a
“substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance
88
of a declaratory judgment.” The existence of a “substantial
controversy,” which rises from the accusations of patent infringement,
89
gives the patent holder notice of impending litigation.
By requiring licensees in MedImmune-type actions to prove noninfringement, the Federal Circuit rejected “repeated admonitions
90
about the difficulty of proving a negative.” Medtronic adds that the
difficulty of proving a negative is exacerbated in the infringement
context, “because patents regularly contain dozens (even hundreds)
91
of claims, infringement of any one of which triggers liability.” The
licensee proving non-infringement would have to show its product
does not incorporate any of the claims, while the patent holder
81. Id. (quoting Deere & Co. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 322 F. Supp. 397, 398 (E.D. Cal.
1970)).
82. Id. at 37.
83. “In actions alleging infringement of a process patent . . . the product shall be presumed
to have been so made, and the burden of establishing that the product was not made by the
process shall be on the party asserting that it was not so made.” 35 U.S.C.A. § 295 (West 2013).
84. Brief for petitioner, supra note 9, at 37.
85. Id. at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 42 (quoting MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 43 (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 311 (2004)).
91. Id. at 44.
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asserting infringement needs to show only that the product does
92
infringe specific claims.
B. Arguments for Respondent, MFV
MFV frames the question as one involving claim coverage as
93
opposed to infringement. In a patent licensing agreement,
infringement “means ‘claim coverage’ because the licensee cannot be
94
an infringer.” The license effectively protects the licensee from being
95
sued for infringement. Therefore, MFV could not accuse Medtronic
of infringement. Whether Medtronic owes royalties is an issue of
96
claim coverage, and any cases Medtronic cites that do not involve
97
claim coverage are inapposite.
MFV cites Schaffer for the default rule that the party seeking
98
relief bears the burden of proof. The license agreement “provided
that Medtronic could file a [declaratory judgment] action if it wanted
99
to seek relief from its license.” Medtronic did file for declaratory
judgment, and, “since the normal default rule is that the plaintiff bears
the burden . . . Medtronic agreed that Medtronic would bear the
100
burden on claim coverage (if it wanted relief from its license).” In
response to Medtronic’s claim that MFV sought relief first by asking
for royalties, MFV clarifies that “to seek relief in a suit means to file a
101
claim or counterclaim.”
The fact that patent holders carry the burden of proof in
traditional infringement actions has no bearing on whether MFV has
102
the burden of proof on claim coverage in declaratory judgment.
Patent holders normally have the infringement burden only because
they are typically the party asserting infringement and seeking
103
relief. If the patent holder does not seek relief, the patent holder

92. Id.
93. Id. at i.
94. Brief for Respondent at 6–7, Medtronic, Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., No. 12-1128 (U.S.
Sep. 16, 2013).
95. Id. at 48.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 37.
98. Id. at 25.
99. Id. at 36.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 47.
102. Id. at 35.
103. Id.
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104

should not have to prove infringement.
MFV poses a hypothetical wherein a patent holder accuses a
competitor of infringement, and the parties agree to settle their
105
dispute through a licensing agreement, rather than litigation. An
adoption of Medtronic’s proposed rule, however, would give patent
106
holders a disincentive to settle disputes with infringers. The patent
holder cannot seek an injunction, damages, or willful infringement
damages if a license exists, but nevertheless bears the burden of proof
107
in declaratory judgment. In this situation patent holders will “be
quite reluctant to settle on such a basis since the patent[] [holder]
108
gives up a lot and receives very little.”
Regarding MedImmune, MFV notes that in the license agreement,
the parties stipulated that either had the right to bring a declaratory
109
judgment action.
Consequently, “[n]either party relied upon
110
MedImmune for this right.”
VI. ANALYSIS
The Court should hold that patent holders have the burden of
proving infringement in declaratory judgment regardless of the
existence of a license. Determining which party bears the burden of
proof is critical for patent-holding companies that may face
substantial losses when a patent is held to be invalid or not
111
infringed. This decision also impacts the licensee who will no longer
have to pay royalties to the patent holder. But the outcome of
Medtronic will reach far past the two parties embroiled in litigation,
influencing both future inventors and future licensing agreements.
Several factors weigh against shifting the burden to licensees. First,
considerations of fairness, convenience, and policy weigh in favor of
imposing the burden on the patent holder. Second, the Federal Circuit
ruling creates a presumption of infringement at odds with
congressional intent. Third, MedImmune will not become a sword if
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 39.
107. Id. at 40.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 42.
110. Id.
111. Patents may be especially relevant to pharmaceutical company profitability. See
Bessen & Meurer, supra note 2, at 10. In one case involving a finding of patent invalidity, “Eli
Lilly lost nearly 30% of its stock market value.” Id.
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the Court reverses the Federal Circuit.
A. Considerations of Fairness, Convenience, and Policy
Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg did not join the majority in
Schaffer partly because the majority failed to consider fairness,
convenience, and policy in determining which party carried the
112
burden of proof. The Court should consider these factors in
Medtronic, especially because Congress has invoked considerations of
fairness, convenience, and policy in recent debates about the patent
113
system’s effectiveness in promoting innovation. Deciding which
party bears the burden of proof in patent infringement without
considering these factors would exacerbate fairness concerns with the
patent system as a whole. If the Court considers these factors in
Medtronic, the factors will weigh in favor of keeping the burden of
proving infringement with the patent holder.
Fairness to future inventors suggests the Court should not require
declaratory judgment plaintiffs to prove non-infringement. The
114
Court’s 2011 decision in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership
upheld a clear and convincing evidence standard for proving patent
115
invalidity. Critics of the Court’s decision focus on the importance of
116
invalidating bad patents in order to justify the “embarrassment of
117
an exclusive patent.” By maintaining the “clear and convincing”
evidence standard, the Court creates a tough barrier for any litigant
seeking to invalidate a patent. Through this decision, the Court may
have inadvertently “clear[ed] the way for holders of bad patents to
118
stifle innovation and business growth.”
112. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I
do not understand the majority to disagree with the proposition that a court, taking into account
policy considerations, convenience, and fairness could conclude the purpose of a statute is best
effectuated by placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); id. at 63 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“As the Fourth Circuit recognized, however,
‘other factors,’ prime among them ‘policy considerations, convenience, and fairness’ may
warrant a different allocation.” (citation omitted)).
113. See WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. REPORT,
R41638, PATENT REFORM IN THE 112TH CONGRESS: INNOVATION ISSUES 1 (2011).
114. 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
115. Id. at 2242.
116. Kristen Dietly, Note, Lightening the Load: Whether the Burden of Proof for
Overcoming a Patent’s Presumption of Validity Should be Lowered, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2615,
2656–57 (2010).
117. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326–35 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903).
118. Irina Oberman, Maintaining the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard for Patent
Invalidity Challenges in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238, (2011), 35
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Similar to the criticisms of Microsoft, the Federal Circuit’s burden
allocation could stifle innovation by raising the bar for proving a
product does not infringe a certain patent. The declaratory judgment
licensee facing infringement liability is at a disadvantage when two
essential defenses to patent infringement—invalidity and noninfringement—require “clear and convincing” evidence and proof of
119
a negative, respectively. In order to prove non-infringement, the
licensee must show that they did not infringe the patent, whereas the
patent holder proving infringement would have to show the licensee
120
did infringe the patent. MedImmune aided licensees by permitting
them to bring declaratory judgment actions without being subject to
121
liability through coercive patent infringement suits. The Federal
Circuit decision would reduce this benefit to licensees in a
122
“potentially outcome-determinative respect.”

HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 439, 441 (2012). But see Joshua L. Sohn, Can’t the PTO Get a Little
Respect?, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1603, 1605 (2011) (“Yet, a judicial decision to invalidate a
patent is essentially a judicial overturning of the PTO’s decision to grant the patent. . . . ‘[C]lear
and convincing evidence’ is a significantly lower standard of proof than the normal standard that
a litigant must satisfy before a court will overturn an administrative decision.”).
119. Proof of non-infringement requires proof of a negative, and the difficulty of proving a
negative in the patent context is substantial. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 12.
120. The Schaffer Court specifically said the burden of proof could shift to defendants in
declaratory judgment actions where the plaintiff asserts an affirmative defense. Schaffer ex rel.
Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 57 (2005). Both non-infringement and invalidity are listed under
35 U.S.C. § 282(b) as “defenses in any action involving the validity or infringement of a patent.”
Infringement is not an “affirmative defense[] in the traditional sense, because the defendant
asserting the defense does not take on the burden[] of production or persuasion.” Roger Allan
Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Non-infringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71 (forthcoming 2013)
(manuscript at 73 n.5); see also Certain Programmable Digital Clock Thermostats, Inv. No. 337TA-278, USITC Pub. 1 (Apr. 12, 1988) (Final) (finding defendant “pleaded non-infringement,
but this is not an affirmative defense”). Justice Thomas’s MedImmune dissent rightly
characterized patent invalidity as an affirmative defense. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting). If Thomas similarly characterizes noninfringement as an affirmative defense, the exception created in Schaffer would permit the
burden to shift to the defendant.
121. MedImmune, Inc., 549 U.S. at 129.
122. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 3.
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Burden of proof allocation is often outcome-determinative.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit rule directly impacts whether patent
licensees in declaratory judgment actions will be found liable for
infringement. Forcing the declaratory judgment plaintiff to prove
non-infringement increases the likelihood of finding infringement
relative to the corresponding coercive suit. Whether a product
infringes the underlying patent, in declaratory judgment or otherwise,
has critical ramifications not just in terms of royalty payments, but
124
also for future inventors. It is better for the future inventor if the
licensee “bets the farm” and enters into a coercive patent suit where
the patent holder has the burden of proof; when a product is found
not to infringe a patent, inventors may build off the product without
fearing subsequent infringement litigation brought by the same patent
holder. Shifting the burden of proof increases the likelihood of finding
infringement, which may disrupt innovation and deprive the public of
potential scientific and technological breakthroughs.
B. Presumption of Infringement
The Federal Circuit presumed Medtronic’s products infringed the
underlying patent. The court determined Medtronic, as the plaintiff,
should bear the burden because Medtronic sought declaratory
judgment as stipulated by the license agreement. The court
characterized MFV as merely wanting to enjoy its contract and to be
125
discharged from the suit. However, without the presumption of
infringement, MFV would properly be characterized as the party who
disturbed the parties’ status by asking Medtronic to pay royalties. This
123. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Lawrence S. Pope, Dethroning Lear? Incentives to
Innovation After MedImmune, 24 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 971, 974 (2009) (“[P]atentability law
tends to be so highly unsettled that it is easy to mount credible challenges.”); Thomas A. Mayes
et al., Allocating the Burden of Proof in Administrative and Judicial Proceedings Under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 27, 80 (2005) (“In areas of law
characterized by indeterminacy, a shift in the burden of proof is often outcomedeterminative.”); Sandra M. Di Iorio, Comment, Breaking IDEA’s Silence: Assigning the
Burden of Proof at Due Process Hearings and Judicial Proceedings Brought by Parents Against a
School District, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 719, 726 (2005) (“Allocation of the burden of proof is often
outcome-determinative.”).
124. E.g., Howard F. Chang, Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation, 26
RAND J. ECON. 34, 34 (1995) (“Theses [infringement] decisions have important effects on the
pace of technological progress through the incentives to invent not only the first invention but
also later inventions that build upon the first.”).
125. Medtronic, Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 695 F.3d 1266, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(“Medtronic and not MFV . . . is asking the court to disturb the status quo ante and to relieve it
from a royalty obligation it believes it does not bear.”), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20,
2013).
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presumption of infringement conflicts with congressional intent, as
evidenced by the express presumption of validity created under 35
126
U.S.C. § 282(a).
Congress placed the “burden of establishing invalidity of a patent
127
or any claim thereof . . . on the party asserting such invalidity.”
128
Courts have held accordingly. Under § 282(a) Congress declined to
create a presumption of infringement while clearly creating a
presumption of validity. As petitioners observe, Congress also
expressly created a rebuttable presumption of infringement for
129
process patents, but this presumption is conspicuously absent from §
130
271. By creating a presumption of infringement the Federal Circuit’s
ruling conflicts with congressional intent.
C. MedImmune’s Shield as a Sword
MedImmune will not become a proverbial sword against patent
holders if the Federal Circuit ruling is reversed. The Federal Circuit
expressed concern that forcing MFV to carry the burden of proof
“would allow licensees to use MedImmune’s shield as a sword—haling
licensors into court and forcing them to assert and prove what had
131
already been resolved by license.” MedImmune permitted licensees
to seek declaratory judgment without breaching their license because
132
the situation qualified as “a case of actual controversy.” If the
license resolved the infringement issue, no controversy would exist
133
and declaratory judgment would not be permitted. Further, the
nature of declaratory judgment oftentimes means “the injury-in-fact
that gives a declaratory judgment plaintiff Article III standing is the
126. 35 U.S.C.A. § 282(a) (West 2013) (“In General. A patent shall be presumed valid.”).
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1573
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he one attacking validity has the burden of proving invalidity by clear and
convincing evidence.” (citing Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
129. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 37. “Through § 295, Congress imposed a
rebuttable presumption of infringement that shifts the burden of production in certain carefully
defined circumstances.” Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-83, at 57 (1987)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
130. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 271.
131. Medtronic, Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 695 F.3d 1266, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert.
granted, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013).
132. Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 133–34 (2007).
133. District Courts are vested with discretion to dismiss declaratory judgment actions
“because facts bearing on the usefulness of the declaratory judgment remedy, and the fitness of
the case for resolution, are peculiarly within their grasp.” Id. at 136 (quoting Wilton v. Seven
Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289 (1995)).
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threat of legal liability in an enforcement suit that could be, but has
not been, brought against it by the declaratory judgment
134
defendant.”
The assumption is that the defendant threatens
infringement—as MFV did by notifying Medtronic of the products
135
that allegedly infringed the patents —otherwise the plaintiff lacks
standing. Therefore, defendants are not forced to assert infringement;
the assertion is implied because plaintiffs have standing.
The sword concern is further diminished in the current case by the
136
parties’ contractual agreement. MFV must have some proof of
infringement in order to identify which of Medtronic’s products
infringe the patent. It is hard to see how MFV is being “forced” to
assert and prove infringement when the assertions were made
willingly, and those assertions required MFV to have some quantum
of proof. Essentially, “[a]ny general fairness concerns in favor of
placing the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff are muted where, as
here, the parties’ agreements explicitly provide for the bringing of a
137
licensee declaratory judgment action.”
VII. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Medtronic improperly gives the
declaratory judgment plaintiff-licensee Medtronic the burden of
proving non-infringement. In a declaratory judgment action for noninfringement, the plaintiff-licensee is necessarily at risk for
infringement liability. The plaintiff in this instance should not bear the
burden of disproving what they are impliedly accused of doing
because this allocation of the burden does not comport with
congressional intent or the procedural nature of declaratory
judgments. To remedy the situation, the Supreme Court will likely
reverse the Federal Circuit and hold the burden of proving
infringement remains with the patent holder.

134. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22, Medtronic,
Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., No. 12-1128 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2013).
135. See supra Section II.
136. See supra text accompanying note 21.
137. Brief of Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 30, Medtronic, Inc.
v. Bos. Scientific Corp., No. 12-1128 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2013).

